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SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION: EXPANSION AND
CONTRACTION IN MONOPOLIZATION LAW
MICHAL S. GAL*
AVISHALOM TOR**
SPENCER WEBER WALLER***
In the past decade, the question of what constitutes monopolizing
conduct once again has gained center stage in antitrust discourse after a
long period of relative dormancy. Enforcement agencies, courts, and
scholars alike have all attempted to draw a clear line between conduct
that a monopolist should be allowed to undertake and that which
should be prohibited.1 This task is by no means an easy one. The confer-
* Professor and Co-Director of the Forum for Law and Markets, University of Haifa
Faculty of Law. We would like to thank the Antitrust Law Journal for making this Sympo-
sium possible and, in particular, would like to thank Andreas Reindl and Bruce Hoffman,
the Journats Symposium editors, for their hard work and excellent editing of the contri-
butions to this Symposium issue.
** Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of the Forum for Law and Markets, University of
Haifa Faculty of Law.
*** Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola Univer-
sity Chicago School of Law.
I See, for instance, the extensive U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n Joint
Hearings on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Single-Firm Conduct as Related to Competition
(June 20, 2006-May 8, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/
singlejfirm/sfchearing.htm; European Comm'n, DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Ap-
plication of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (2005), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf [hereinafter Commission Discussion
Paper]; European Comm'n, DG Competition, Communication from the Commission-Gui-
dance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Ex-
clusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7 (Dec. 3, 2008) [hereinafter
Commission Guidance]; ECON. ADVISORY GRoup ON COMPETITION POLICY, REPORT ON AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC (July 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/studies/eagcpjuly_21_05.pdf [hereinafter EAGCP REPORT].
For some of the recent scholarly literature on this subject, see, e.g., ROBERT O'DONOGHUE
& A. JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 EC (2006); Thomas Eilmans-
berger, How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition Under Article 82 EC: In Search of Clearer
and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses, 42 COMMON MARKET L. Rv. 129
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ence held at the University of Haifa on May 24-25, 2009, sought to ad-
dress this monopolization debate.
Indeed, the varied themes developed in the present Symposium's es-
says and articles clearly illustrate the challenges presently facing monop-
olization law. Yet this brief commentary focuses on one particular facet
of current monopolization law that is manifested in a number of the
symposium articles-namely, its concomitant expansion and contrac-
tion processes. Monopolization prohibitions are proliferating world-
wide, leading to the expansion of both enforcement activity and
scholarship examining this area of antitrust. However, this expansion
has been accompanied by a contraction of the scope of such prohibi-
tions and the limits they impose on monopolists and dominant firms,
most notably in the United States and to a lesser degree in the Euro-
pean Union and elsewhere. 2 We suggest these seemingly contradictory
trends are at least partly complementary, resulting from the confluence
of global and domestic factors.
Until recently, the leading antitrust enforcers of the United States and
the European Union, as well as international institutions, such as the
OECD, the World Bank, and the International Competition Network
(ICN), mostly focused on cartels, both international and domestic, and
merger enforcement. The focus on cartels was driven, among other fac-
(2005); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 255
(2003); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral
Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CI. L. REv. 73 (2005); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclu-
sion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 147 (2005); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of
the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards, 93 GEO. L.J. 1623, 1624 (2005); Giorgio Monti,
The Concept of Dominance in Article 82, 2 EUR. COMPETrTONJ. 31 (2006); Steven C. Salop,
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 A--
TRUST L.J. 311 (2006); John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1,
16-17 (1995).
As of December 1, 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon became effective and introduced a re-
numbering of the articles in the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Relevant
to the discussion here, Article 82 is now Article 102. However, for ease of reference, we
will continue to use the prior numbering in our discussion. Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, art. 102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 (effective Dec. 1, 2009)
[hereinafter EU Functioning Treaty].
2 See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009); Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Illinois Tool
Works Inc., v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Peter Carstensen, False Positives in Identify-
ing Liability for Exclusionary Conduct: Conceptual Error, Business Reality, and Aspen, 2008 Wis.
L. REv. 295; Commission Guidance, supra note 1, 5 (stating that the Commission is moving
towards a more economic (or effects-based) approach in the Article 82 area).
3 See, e.g., International Competition Network, http://www.internationalcompetition
network.org; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), http:/
/www.oecd.org.
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tors, by broad consensus regarding the harm they generate; 4 the possi-
bility of relying on simple legal tests, rather than complex economic
analyses, to condemn cartelizing behaviors;5 their significant negative
economic effects; 6 and the common interest of different jurisdictions in
enforcement against international cartels, with its positive spillover ef-
fects.7 The focus on mergers, on the other hand, has been driven by the
requirement of most merger regimes that enforcement agencies react
once a merger has been notified; 8 by the expansion of trade, which led
to several significant international mergers and acquisitions waves;9 and
by the growing need to reduce the high, duplicative costs of interna-
tional merger review.10
4 The Supreme Court noted in Trinko that cartels are "the supreme evil of antitrust."
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. See, e.g., OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD
CORE CARTELS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS,
DAFFE/COMP(2002)7 (Apr. 9, 2002) (on the harm created by cartels and the impor-
tance of appropriate sanctions) [hereinafter OECD REPORT].
5 See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (reiterating that "[p]rice-fixing
agreements between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing
agreements, fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful"). But see
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
49, 63 (2007) (arguing that "signs abound that the law of collaborative restraints of trade
is collapsing from both of its rule-bound poles-per se legality and per se illegality-
toward a flexible center").
6 See, e.g., Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels
and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 801 (2004); John Connor & Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private International
Cartels: 1990-2005 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=944039.
7 See, e.g., OECD REPORT, supra note 4; Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments: In-
creasing Deterrence of International Cartels Through Jurisdictional Reliance, 51 VA. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2010).
8 See, e.g., ICN Merger Working Group, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.
org/working-groups/current/merger.aspx.
9 Eileen Fumagalli & Helder Vasconcelos, Cross-Border Merger Waves (Centre for Eco-
nomic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series No. 5601, Apr. 2006), http://www.ifn.se/
Wfiles/Vaxholm-06/fumagalli vasconcelos.pdf; Bernard S. Black, The First International
Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last U.S. Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 799 (2000); Ajit Singh &
Rahul Dhumale, The Global Merger Wave: Transnational Corporations, Global Policy Forum
(Nov. 1999), http://globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221-transnational-
corporations/47146.html.
10 See, e.g., Notification and Procedures Subgroup of the Merger Working Group, ICN,
Report on the Costs and Burdens of Multijurisdictional Merger Review (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc332.pdf; Bus. &
Indus. Advisory Comm. to the OECD & Int'l Chamber of Com., Recommended Framework for
Best Practices in International Merger Control Procedures (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.
biac.org/statemeits/comp/BIAC-ICCMergerPaper.pdf; William J. Rowley & A. Neil
Campbell, A Comment on the Estimated Costs of Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Reviews, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Sept. 2003, at 1, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/03/09/comment.
pdf.
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Many of the factors that facilitated interest and expanded enforce-
ment in the cartel.and merger areas, however, have had the opposite
effect where monopolization was concerned. There has been little con-
sensus, for instance, regarding which unilateral conduct of monopolies
and dominant firms is anticompetitive" and which, if any, remedies
were appropriate. 12 Moreover, the simpler legal tests that were once ap-
plied in this area have fallen from favor, first in U.S. antitrust and later
in EU competition law, after having been criticized for their over-inclu-
siveness and lack of clear guiding foundations.13 Consequently, enforce-
ment in the unilateral conduct area became all the more difficult and
contentious. These difficulties were exacerbated, moreover, by the con-
flicting interests of different jurisdictions in the monopolization context
due to the potential for negative effects of foreign enforcement actions
against one's domestic firms.' 4
Nevertheless, over time, other global and domestic factors-including
increased levels of international trade and the growth and strengthen-
ing of dominant international firms, the worldwide proliferation of anti-
trust regimes with their attendant spillover effects, liberalization of
markets which brought to the forefront dominant firms that were for-
merly state-controlled or otherwise highly regulated, and the growing
economic importance of dynamically competitive industries-combined
to make monopolization again a focal point of scholarly interest and
enforcement activity.' 5
Monopolization law gained importance due to increased levels of
trade and the opening of borders, which helped large multinational
firms become key players in many jurisdictions. 6 Because multinational
firms sometimes dominate and exploit markets in developing jurisdic-
tions, such jurisdictions seek tools to reduce their exploitation, also
turning to monopolization prohibitions that may even become the cor-
n See, e.g., supra note 1.
12 Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 11 (2008).
13 See, e.g., supra note 1.
14 WILLIAM H. PAGE &JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECH-
NOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (2007); Nicholas Economides & loannis Lianos, The
Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the
Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (2009).
15 The role monopolization prohibitions plays in convincing the public in newer anti-
trust jurisdictions to adopt antitrust laws is another contributing force, although many of
these jurisdictions do not apply their laws in practice against dominant international
firms. See Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges
Faced by Small and by Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (2009).
16 ELEANOR M. Fox, LAWRENCE A. SULLVAN & RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 278 (2d ed. 2004).
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nerstone of their new antitrust law.17 This dynamic also motivated devel-
oping jurisdictions to request that the subject be put on the ICN
agenda.18
A related concern is reflected in the statement of Christine Varney,
the Assistant Attorney General* for Antitrust at the U.S. Department of
Justice, that "unless we ... can sit at the table and jointly continue to
pursue the evolution of ... Section 2, I think we are going to cede this
territory to the Europeans entirely and we're not [going to] have a
whole lot to say about what abuse of dominance looks like for a global
firm."' 9 This statement acknowledges the limits of national governance.
The jurisdiction with the strictest regulation that can also create a credi-
ble threat of enforcement may impact both the worldwide conduct of
international firms and domestic consumer welfare.
Another important factor involves the liberalization of previously
highly regulated industries, many of which involve dominant firms. Such
a liberalization process has occurred in the past two decades, for in-
stance, in Eastern Europe, as well as in some countries in South America
and Asia, which experienced a transition from centrally planned re-
gimes to more market-oriented ones. 20 Indeed, studies of these jurisdic-
tions often indicate that the most important issue they face in the
introduction of competition into their markets involves the regulation
of previously state-controlled or closely regulated industries, and much
greater effort is directed towards regulating such firms than towards car-
tels or merger enforcement.2'
17 Mostjurisdictions that adopted an antitrust regime have prohibitions against monop-
olization. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical
Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (2007);
Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust World Reports, http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/
index.php/MainPage; ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Group, http://www.interna-
tionalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/unilateral.aspx.
18 The subject was added to the ICN agenda in 2006.
19 Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Re-
marks at the American Antitrust Institute Annual Conference, Panel on Re-energizing
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.
org/archives/files/20080619_pv aai06l908holemanbreakout_020320091323.mp3.
20 See, e.g., MAR10 OJALA, THE COMPETITION LAW OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
(1999) (providing a summary of Central and Eastern European countries' transition to
competition laws that are closely aligned with EU competition law); OECD, COMPETITION
LAw AND POLICY IN BALTIC COUNTRIES (1999).
21 On the problem of pre-existing monopolies and central state regulation of their eco-
nomic power in Central and Eastern European countries, see, e.g., Tibor Varady, The
Emergence of Competition Law in (Former) Socialist Countries, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 252-56,
261-62 (1999). On such problems in Latin America, see, e.g., COMPETITrON POLICY, DER-
EGULATION, AND MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA (Moisrs Naim & Joseph S. Tulchin
eds., 1999).
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These developments in the international arena also have coincided
with the increased economic significance of dynamically competitive,
new economy industries.22 The common characteristics of these indus-
tries-such as high rates of innovation, network effects, and the central-
ity of IP rights-sometimes lead to concentrated market structures with
dominant firms. Thus, high rates of innovation may be an advantage for
large firms that are able to make continued investments in research and
development. Network effects, which reflect economies of scale in con-
sumption, similarly benefit large networks over small ones and may lead
to competition among platforms for an unavoidable dominant position
in the market.23 Furthermore, new economy industries also typically rely
on IP protection to facilitate investment in innovation-related activities,
which in turn increases the likelihood of dominance. 24 In these markets,
therefore, the need to address the monopolization challenge is all the
greater. Hence, it is not surprising that the same high-profile cases that
helped re-ignite the international interest in abuse of dominance, such
as Microsoft and Intel, as well as the recent European Commission investi-
gation involving Google, 25 also concerned those dynamically competitive
industries.
These multiple factors have combined to increase both the interna-
tional reach of monopolization law and its economic significance. How-
ever, the increased role of economic analysis in antitrust generally and
monopolization specifically has led to both a rationalization of monop-
oly law and a contraction of its scope.2 6 This contraction has taken place,
most notably, in both the United States and the European Union, albeit
22 See, e.g, Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Anti-
trust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2001) (examining the high-tech sec-
tor); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001)
(considering the software, Internet, and communications industries); Christian Ahlborn
et al., DG Comp's Discussion Paper on Article 82: Implications of the Proposed Frame-
work and Antitrust Rules for Dynamically Competitive Industries (Mar. 2006) (referring
to the high-tech and innovation industries), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competi
tion/antitrust/art82/057.pdf.
23 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 105-06 (describing the phenomenon of "tipping"-that
is, "the tendency of one system to pull away from its rivals in popularity once it has gained
an initial edge."); see generally Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law on Compatibility and Innovation, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 609 (1998);
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 479 (1998).
24 E.g., Ahlborn et al., supra note 22.
21 SeeJames Kanter, New Complaints Filed Against Google in Europe, Feb. 24, 2010, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/technology/com-
panies/25antitrust.html.
26 See supra note 1.
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to different extents that reflect these regimes' different values, beliefs,
and relevant legal frameworks.
The contraction of the scope of unilateral conduct regulation in U.S.
antitrust law has been spearheaded by scholarly critique that revealed
how common legal formulae in this area had little clear meaning and
scope and were lacking a rational foundation.27 These criticisms were
then incorporated into Supreme Court jurisprudence that posed in-
creasingly stringent hurdles for antitrust plaintiffs alleging monopoliza-
tion. 28 Moreover, a contraction has also been manifested in the
significant reduction of enforcement activity in this area in recent de-
cades, despite a small number of highly visible cases that were still pur-
sued by the agencies. 29
In Europe, the contraction of unilateral conduct regulation has been
more recent, more equivocal, and less dramatic than its U.S. counter-
part. The Member States engaged in a debate, led by the Commission,
seeking to review the basis and the content of the abuse of dominance
prohibition.3 The resultant guidance indicated a more economically
oriented approach, which gives less weight to legal presumptions of
abuse and emphasizes an analysis of the effects of specific conduct in a
given case.31 This European debate also has led to the understanding
that at least some past legal rules must be contracted in order to ensure
that the Treaty of Rome meets its goals.3 2 Furthermore, many of the
abuse of dominance prohibitions adopted around the world are based
on the Treaty,3 3 and small, transition, or less developed jurisdictions
27 Id.
28 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Illinois Tool Works
Inc., v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
29 Such cases include, inter alia, Microsoft and Intel. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam); Case COMP/C-3/37.990-Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel, Comm'n Decision (May 13, 2009), available at http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel-provisional-decision.pdf.
30 See EAGCP REPORT, supra note 1; Commission Discussion Paper, supra note 1; Commission
Guidance, supra note 1.
31 Id.
32 Although, notably, Member States at the same time retained the right to have more
stringent laws on the abuse of dominance under Article 82. At the EU level, the white
paper met a complicated political response and, ultimately, was only partially reflected in
the resulting enforcement guidelines. See, e.g., Ariel Ezrachi, The European Commission Gui-
dance on Article 82 EC-The Way in Which Institutional Realities Limit the Potential for Reformn
(Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27/2009, Aug. 2009), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract= 1463854.
33 Many jurisdictions have transplanted Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community (consolidated text), art. 82, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (321E) 37. A re-
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sometimes rely on the case law and academic studies from large, devel-
oped jurisdictions for their decisions.3 4 The contraction in the scope of
liability under monopolization prohibitions in the United States and the
European Union may therefore generate some spillover effects in other
jurisdictions as well.
Yet the overall contraction of monopolization law in these leading ju-
risdictions might serve to facilitate, rather than inhibit, its expansion
and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes
with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved
in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's in-
creased reach also has made its refinement and rationalization all the
more important for jurisdictions seeking to avoid the harmful chilling
effects associated with excessive enforcement in this area.
Contraction also might be motivated by external pressures, resulting
from spillover effects.3 5 Most importantly, foreign monopolization
prohibitions may affect the conduct of international firms in other mar-
kets in which they operate, due to linkages among their activities in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Such linkages exist, for example, when the
production, design, or marketing of differentiated products in different
jurisdictions are too costly due to scale economies.16 Linkages also may
result from the need to realize network effects that require that consum-
ers use similar products. 37 In such cases, a prohibition that prevents
firms from engaging in certain conduct (e.g., quality-increasing techno-
logical integration) in one jurisdiction might affect consumers in other
jurisdictions as well. Notably, concerns over spillover effects on the pro-
duction and worldwide sale of products with similar quality garnered
much international attention following such high-profile cases as
Microsoft and Inte 8 These spillover effects create external pressures to
view by the authors reveals that these include, inter alia, the twenty-seven EU Member
States and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greenland, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Serbia-Mon-
tenegro, and Namibia. Eight additional jurisdictions followed the EU provisions, with mi-
nor changes: Albania, Armenia, Jersey, Macedonia, Mauritius, Singapore, Uruguay,
Venezuela. See, e.g., Hylton & Deng, supra note 17 (which includes references to the text
of the antitrust laws of most jurisdictions).
34 Michal S. Gal & Jorge Padilla, The Follower Phenomenon: Implications for the Design of
Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, infra this issue, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 899 (2010); see
also Michal S. Gal, The "Cut and Paste" of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Conditions for a
Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J.L. REFORM 467 (2007).
35 Gal & Padilla, supra note 34.
36 Id.
37 Id.; see also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (briefly discussing network
effects).
38 At least until the recent announcement by Microsoft that it will sell differentiated
products in different markets.
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apply monopolization prohibitions only where justified by efficiency
concerns.
All in all, our analysis here suggests that the expansion and contrac-
tion of monopolization law may be at least partly complementary, rather
than wholly contradictory. A better understanding and evaluation of
these trends is therefore likely to necessitate theirjoint, rather than sep-
arate, evaluation in future antitrust scholarship of which this Symposium
is merely the beginning.

